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THE INTERDEPENDENT NATURE OF
COMPUTER SOFTWARE: ANOTHER
REASON WHY USER-INTERFACES
SHOULD NOT BE PROTECTED
BY COPYRIGHT LAW
DAvID B. FONDA*

INTRODUCTION
The first computers were developed in the 1940's.1 In the
1950's and 1960's, computer programs automated electric switches
that once were operated by hand.2 With the advent of semiconductor technology in the 1970's, microcomputers became affordable to
small businesses and to home users. 3 This new affordability opened
new markets that led to remarkable advances in computer science
throughout the 1980's. With every advance in computer hardware
scores of software producers emerged, seeking to capitalize on the
high demand for programs that would run on these new affordable
computers. 4 The marketability of these software programs depended in large part on how easy they were for the typical user to
operate. 5 The user-interface 6 of a program became an increasingly
valuable part of the software package. 7 As the time, and consequently the cost, of producing more innovative user-interfaces increased, so did the amount of copying.8 Throughout this
information revolution, the courts "often struggled awkwardly to
* David Fonda received a B.S. in Mathematics from Brigham Young University, and a J.D. from the Gonzaga University School of Law where he was
the Editor-in-Chief of the Gonzaga Law Review. Mr. Fonda has developed programs for the National Security Agency and is currently a Judicial Clerk for
the Honorable Norman Jackson of the Utah Court of Appeals.
1. Vance F. Brown, The Incompatibility of Copyright and Computer
Software: An EconomicEvaluationand a Proposalfor a MarketplaceSolution,
66 N.C. L. REv. 977, 979 (1988).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 979-80.
4. Id. at 980.
5. Brett N. Dorny & Michael K. Friedland, Copyrighting "Look and Feel"
Manufacturers: Technologies v. CAMS, 3 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 195, 195 (1990).
6. The user-interface of the program is that interactive portion generated
by the program that helps the user utilize the program. It may consist of help
screens, pull-down menus, or various command sequences.
7. Dorny & Friedland, supra note 5, at 196.
8. Id.
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provide adequate legal protection for the ever-changing industry." 9
Today, courts predominantly use copyright law to protect computer
software.
The Constitution grants Congress the "power to promote the
progress of science.., by securing for limited times to authors ...
the exclusive right to their respective writings . . . ."10 Congress
first exercised this power when it enacted Title 17 of the United
States Code, the Copyright Act. Thus, the Constitutional purpose
of the Copyright Act is to "promote the progress of science.""1
Since that first enactment, the Copyright Act has undergone significant change. Today, the Copyright Act 12 allows the "respective
writings" language of the Constitution to include computer programs, and the "authors" language to include computer programmers.13 The Copyright Act provides a definition of "computer
program." 14 However, the definition speaks only of statements and
instructions or "literal manifestations" of a program. Whether or
not "nonliteral" manifestations, such as the user-interface of a program fall within the scope of the Copyright Act is left to judicial
interpretation. 15 This article first explains the difference between
literal and nonliteral manifestations of a program and defines userinterface. This article then analyzes how the judiciary presently interprets Section 102 of the Copyright Act 1 6 to grant copyright protection to user-interfaces. Finally, this article discusses how the
interdependent nature of computer programs makes protecting the
user-interface of a program through section 102 impossible and at
odds with the constitutional purpose of the Copyright Act.

I. THE LITERAL AND NONLrERAL MANIFESTATIONS OF
COMPUTER SOFTWARE

Computer software has both literal and nonliteral manifestations of its existence. Particular aspects of software can be repro9.

Keith A. Styrcula, The Adequacy of CopyrightProtectionfor Computer

Software in the European Community 1992: A CriticalAnalysis of the EC's

Draft Directive, 31 Jun-mmICs J. 329, 329 n.2 (1991).
I0. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

11. Id
12. The Copyright Act that governs today is the 1976 Copyright Act, 17

U.S.C. §§ 100-914 (1988).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
14. Id.
15. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 46 (D.
Mass. 1990). In late April of this year, U.S. District Judge Vaughn Walker
handed down an oral ruling in Apple Computer's case against Microsoft Corp.,
declaring that certain characteristics of a visual display are not protected by
copyright law. Heather Clancy, Ruling Could Spur Software DevelopmentApple Takes Hit in Microsoft, COMPUTER RESELLER NEws, Apr. 20, 1992, at 2.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
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duced in a tangible form, while others cannot. To fully understand
the difference, it is helpful to consider what constitutes a particular
piece of computer software.
A.

Computer Software Background

Computers only perform the tasks which programmers instruct them to perform. If they have no instructions to follow, they
are essentially useless. 17 The instructions that govern all the functions of a computer are called the computer's program, or software.
There are two basic types of software: operating system software
and applications software.' 8 Operating systems software such as
DOS, UNIX, ZENIX, or OS/2 control the basic functions of the
computer's hardware.' 9 Applications software allows the user to
perform a certain task such as word processing, spreadsheet calculations or database management.
The first step in software development is determining what the
program must accomplish. Once the task is defined, software designers often create a flowchart outlining the exact steps that the
program is to follow. A flowchart is a kind of symbolic outline or
schematic representation of a computer program's logic. It is the
first manifestation of the program.20 The next step for the designer
is to translate each logical step of the flowchart into a language or
code that the computer can understand. Programming languages
are either "low-level," "intermediate-level" or "high-level" depending on how closely the language corresponds to the language of the
individual computer. The lowest level of programming language is
called machine code. 21 Machine code is usually written in either a
binary22 or a hexadecimal form. 23 Machine code is specific to each
computer and must be written in the machine code of the computer
that on which the software will be executed. Software designers
write software in machine code because software executes the fastest when written in the lowest level of programming language. 24
Software written in either an intermediate-level or a high-level programming language must be converted into machine language
17. ROBN BRADBEER, Er AL., THE BEGINNER'S GUIDE To COMPUTERS 8
(1982).
18. Id.
19. Id.

20. See, e.g., BRADBEER ET AL., supra note 17, at 59-61; Stephen Breyer, The
Uneasy Casefor Copyright- A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies,and
Computer Programs,84 HFARV. L. REV. 281, 341 n.235 (1970).
21. BRADBEER ET AL., supra note 17.

22. Binary code is represented by the characters "0" and "1." Id.
23. Hexadecimal code is represented by the characters 0-9 and A-F.
Whereas one "byte" is represented by eight digits in binary code, a "byte" can
be represented by just two digits in hexadecimal code. Id. at 197.
24. Id. at 198.
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before it can be executed on the computer. This process is referred
to either as assembling or compiling, depending on the level of programming language in which the software is written.25 Software
designers use intermediate-level or high-level programming languages to write software because the languages are similar to every26
day language and are easier for the designer to understand.
Higher-level languages are also not machine specific and can be
used on different computers because they are translated into the
machine code of the computer they are executing on at the time
that the computer software is being executed.
Software encoded in machine language is called object code and
can be executed directly by the computer's Central Processing Unit
(CPU) without need for assembling or compiling. Software written
in any higher-level language is called source code and must be
translated into machine code before being executed. Today, most
software designers write their programs in a higher-level language
like FORTRAN (FORmula TRANslator), COBOL (COmmon Business Oriented Language), Pascal, BASIC (Beginner's All-purpose
Symbolic Instruction Code), or the language most programers use,
"C." Since software written in these languages must be converted
into machine language, most programs today have both a source
code and an object code.
B. The InterdependentNature of Computer Software
Most commercial software is composed of three interdependent
parts. The first is what this author calls the "basic form" of the
program, the second is the structure or organization of the program,
and the third is the user-interface of the program.
The basic form of the program performs all of the steps of the
flowchart, and directs the computer to perform the basic tasks and
objectives that inspired the programmer to initially write the program. The basic form of a program is functional, but not very efficient or marketable. An efficient program, one that will perform
the desired tasks in the fewest amount of programmed steps, is a
function of the program's structure and organization. The
programmer will restructure and reorganize the basic form until
the program runs at maximum efficiency. This is an essential element of marketable software. This efficient, basic form of the program is still in a form that only someone with a significant amount
of computer acumen can use. Marketable software must be easy for
the average user to understand.
25. BRADBEER, ET AL., supra note 17 at 195.
26. Id. at 96.
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The user-interface of a program packages the efficient basic
form in a way that permits the average user to interact or "interface" with the computer. Its sole purpose is to allow the user to run
the basic form of the program. The software designer may write
source code that will make certain screens appear, or certain menus
appear on the screen that offer a variety of choices to guide the user
through the program. The designer may also designate a certain
key or sequence of key strokes that will generate helpful hints
which appear on the screen. Without the basic form of the program, there would be no need to write a user-interface portion of
the program. However, the quality of the user-interface usually determines how well the overall program sells.
The last step in software development is preparing the documentation or instructions on how to install and use the program.
C. Literal and Nonliteral Manifestationsof the Software
The literal manifestations of a computer program are those
that can be reproduced in a tangible form. The documentation of
the software that is supplied to the user is clearly tangible and a
literal manifestation of the software. The source and object code of
a program can also be printed and put in a tangible form. They too
are literal manifestations of the software. Even the flowchart,
which is symbolic in nature can be put in a tangible form and is a
partially literal manifestation of the software. The way information is conveyed to the user on the screen, however, is a nonliteral
manifestation of the software. The specific sequence of screens or
the fact that by depressing the FO key a help menu will appear are
things that cannot be reduced to a tangible form. These user-interface elements are nonliteral manifestations of the program and are
often referred to as part of the intangible "look and feel" of a
program.
Most courts agree that the literal manifestations of computer
software are copyrightable. Specifically, a program's source code,
object code, and the flowcharts used to map out a program can all
be protected by the Copyright Act. 27 However, courts have trouble
27. Case law is replete with decisions finding the source and object code
protectable under the Copyright Act. See Williams Elec. Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc.,

685 F.2d 870, 876-77 (3d Cir. 1982) (object code copyrightable); Apple Computer,

Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir. 1983) (source and
object code copyrightable), cert dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Midway Mfg.
Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (source and object code
copyrightable); Digital Communications Assoc., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp.,
659 F. Supp. 449, 454 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (source and object code copyrightable);
Hubco Data Products, Corp. v. Management Assistance Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 450, 454 (D. Idaho 1983) (object code copyrightable); GCA Corp. v.
Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718, 720 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (source and object code
copyrightable). The courts have also found that it is a violation to take a de-
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dealing with copyrights for nonliteral manifestations of computer
software.
The difficulty lies in the amorphus nature of "nonliteral" elements of
computer programs. Unlike the written code of a program or a
flowchart that can be printed on paper, nonliteral elements - including
such elements as the overall organization of a program, the structure
of a program's command system, and the presentation of information
on the screen - may be less tangibly represented. 28
Because of these difficulties, whether the nonliteral user-interface
of computer software is protected under the Copyright Act has
been left to judicial interpretation of the Act.
II.

THE PRESENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 102

OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT As IT IS APPLIED
To USER-INTERFACES
The question of whether the user-interface of computer
software is copyrightable depends on how the court interprets the
statutory scope of copyright protection as defined by section 102 of
the Copyright Act. 29 Section 102 is divided into two paragraphs.
Paragraph A provides specific language defining what can be copyrighted. Paragraph B provides a general caveat that must be followed when ascertaining whether something falls within the scope
of copyrightability as defined in paragraph A. To determir
whether the user-interface of computer software is copyrightable,
under section 102 of Title 17 of the United States Code, the judiciary
must interpret the individual language of section 102(a) in light of
the general caveat of section 102(b).
A.

InterpretingThe IndividualLanguage of Section 102(a) of
the Copyright Act to Protect User-Interfaces

The Copyright Act was drafted in 1976 and remains virtually
unchanged except for two minor amendments added in 1980. The
scope of copyright protection, however, was defined almost two centuries earlier. To understand the specific language of Section 102(a)
requires a look back at the history of the scope of copyright
protection.
tailed description of the solution to a problem, (which is what a flowchart is)
and program it into computer source code. Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571,
578 (D. Mass. 1985); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. Univ. Computing Co., 462 F.
Supp. 1003, 1013 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
28. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 46 (D.
Mass. 1990).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
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The history of the statutory languageprotecting copyright

Copyright protection was first offered in the Act of May 31,
1790.30 In that Act, the scope of copyright protection was easily determined. Copyright protection was extended to "any map, chart,
book or books already printed." 3' Specifically listing everything afforded copyright protection had its obvious advantages. However,
whenever Congress decided that some other item belonged on the
"copyrightable" list, it had to repeal or amend the Act. By 1909,
after 119 years of repealing and amending,3 2 Congress decided to
generalize the scope of copyright protection by providing protection
to "all the writings of an author."33 This was a step in the right
direction, except that Congress added a list of examples to help
clarify what "writings of an author" were.- 4 Scientific progress
brought with it the need for more and more examples of what was
copyrightable. Congress was still repealing and amending the current copyright legislation to append the list of examples.35 After
twenty years of hearings, study, debate, and redrafting, Congress
came up with the 1976 Copyright Act and the language of section
102.36

Two 1980 amendments occurred after Congress created the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU) 37 to address potential issues not addressed in the
bill that eventually became the 1976 Copyright Act.38 Congress
gave CONTU the following mandate:
30. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831).
31. Id.
32. In 1802, designs, prints, etchings and engravings were added to the list
of copyright protected items. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171.
This Act was repealed by the Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 14, 4 Stat. 436,436,
439 which added "musical compositions" to the list. The 1831 Act was amended
by the Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138, 139, which added "dramatic
compositions" to the list. The 1856 Act was amended by the Act of Mar. 3, 1865,
ch. 126, §§ 1, 2, 13 Stat. 540, 540 which added "photographs and the negatives
thereof" to the list. The 1865 Act was repealed by the Act of July 8, 1870, ch.
180 § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 which added "statuary" and "models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts" to the list. This Act was repealed in 1909. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 47.
33. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (previously codified at
17 U.S.C. § 4, reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 4 (West Supp. 1990); recodified
1947; repealed 1976).
34. Id. at § 5.
35. In 1912 Congress added "motion pictures" as a further example of "all
the writings of an author." Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, § 5(1)-(m), 37 Stat. 488,
488 (repealed 1976). In 1972 Congress added "sound recordings" to the list. Act
of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub.L. 92-140, § 1(b), 85 Stat. 391, 391 (repealed 1976).
36. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp 37, 47 (D.
Mass. 1990).
37. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).
38. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 49-50.
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(b) The purpose of the Commission is to study and compile data on:
(1) the reproduction and use of copyrighted works of authorship(A) in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing,
processing, retrieving, and transferring information ....
(c) The Commission shall make recommendations as to such purposes access to copyrighted works and to provide recognition of
copyright owners.39

CONTU made its recommendations in a 1978 report. 40 CONTU determined that continued protection for computer programs was desirable, 41 but also that the 1976 Act already provided adequate
protection with respect to the copyrightability of computer programs. 42 CONTU did not recommend any changes to the existing
statutory language, but recommended two statutory amendments.
The first defined what a computer program was 43 and the second
allowed the owner of a computer program to make additional copies
or adaptations of the program." Congress readily adopted both recommendations. 45 The language from the 1976 Copyright Act, along
with the 1980 amendments constitute the statutory law in the area
of copyrights.
39. Id. (quoting the Act of December 31, 1974, Pub. L. 993-573, § 201(b)-(c),
88 Stat. 1873, 1873-74 (1974)).
40. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT (1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].

41. Id. at 20-21.
42. Id. at 16.
43. The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works ("CONTU") recommended that "a 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result." Id. at 14.
44. CONTU made the following recommendation:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 [which grants the copyright
owner the exclusive rights to reproduce the copyrighted work], it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or
authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step
in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine
and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and
that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession
of the computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this
section may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy
from whch such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or
other transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be
transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 31.
45. Congress amended section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act to add
CONTU's definition of a computer program verbatim. Congress also incorporated CONTU's second recommendation into section 117 of the Act. Act of Dec.
12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 and
117, respectively).
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Like the 1909 Copyright Act, the 1976 Act included a general
definition of what could be copyrighted and a list of clarifying examples.46 The 1976 version however, defined what could be protected by the Act in more detail and included a list of examples in
47
broad categories that could encompass several specific examples.
2.

The specific languageof section 102(a)

The cornerstone provision of section 102 states that "copyright
protection subsists... in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible means of expression .... '"48 The scope of copyrightability
can be restated as a work of authorship that meets the two fundamental criteria of originality and fixation in tangible form. 4 9 Interpreting the language of section 102(a) means interpreting the
statutory meaning of "originality," "fixation in a tangible medium,"
and "work of authorship."
a. The "original" language of section 102
The two tools that the judiciary uses when interpreting section
102 of the Copyright Act are the definitions found in section 101 and
section 102's accompanying historical and statutory notes. Congress
purposely left the term "original" undefined in section 101 of the
Copyright Act,50 but the House Report states that the standard
used to judge an original work of authorship "does not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or aesthetic merit, and there is no
intention to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require
46. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976).
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic

works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreo-

graphic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and architectural
works.

Id.
47. In the 1909 Act, copyright protection could secure "all the writings of an
author." Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (previously codified
at 17 U.S.C. § 4, reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 4 (West Supp. 1990); recodified
in 1947; repealed 1976). The 1976 Act, by comparison, granted copyright protection for "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression...." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). The term "works of authorship" was much
broader than the term "writings of an author." The effect was a broader scope
of protection and less necessity for changing the Act.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
49. H.R. REP. No. 1476 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664-65.
50. Id.

746
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them."' The court in Puddu v. Buonamici StatuaryInc. held that
"originality" meant "only that the work owes its origin to the
52
author."
b.

The "fixed in a tangible means of expression" language of
section 102

A "work of authorship" must be "fixed in any tangible medium
of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reprcduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a nr achine or device." 53 The term "fixed" is
defined in Section 101 of the Act, but there is no definition for a
"tangible medium of expression." Section 101 states:
[A] work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the
author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more -han
transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or bot-:, that
are being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of this title if a fixation
54
of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.
Congress intentionally drafted the statutory language concerning
"any tangible medium of expression" broadly so that copyrightability will not be determined based on the form or medium in
which a work is fixed.55 The medium of fixation may be "in words,
numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic
indiciL, whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed,
photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other -ble
form and whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of
any machine or device 'now known or later developed.'9
Copyrightability under section 102(a) depends not on the medium
in which the work of authorship is fixed, but rather the work of
authorship itself.
c.

The "works of authorship" language of section 102

Since 1790 when only maps, charts, and books were protected
by copyright, Congress has gradually expanded the scope of copyright protection. Different areas of subject matter have been effected by this expansion, but none so much as scientific discoveries
and technological advances where there has been so much recent
51. Id.
52. Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401,402 (2d Cir. 1971) (quoting NIMmER, COPYRIGHT § 11 at 33 (1971)).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).

54. Id. at § 101(3).
55. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 49, at 51, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5659, 5665.
56. Id.
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growth. In the computer industry, for example, new advances generally allow for new methods of expression and a potential for new
classifications as "works of authorship." Authors will continue to
find new ways to express themselves, but "it is impossible to foresee
the forms that these new expressive methods will take." 57 The language of section 102 "does not intend either to freeze the scope of
copyrightable subject matter at the present stage of communications technology or to allow unlimited expansion into areas completely outside the present congressional intent."5 8 Congress
intended the term "works of authorship" to extend copyright protection to new methods of expression as they evolved.5 9 Like the
1909 Copyright Act, section 102(a) includes a list of categories to
help clarify the term "works of authorship."
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.60
Section 101 states that the term "including" is meant to be illustrative and not limitative,6 meaning that the scope of "original works
of authorship" is not exhausted by this list. The judiciary's present
interpretation of section 102(a) provides copyright protection to the
user-interface of a computer program.
3.

The judiciary'sapplicationof section 102 to nonliteral
elements of a program

Congress did not include "computer programs" as one of the
categories in section 102; however, "computer programs," as defined
by the Act, fall within the "literary works" category.6 2 Literary
works are defined in Section 101 as "works, other than audiovisual
57. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 48 (D.
Mass. 1990) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 49, at 51, reprintedin 1976

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5659, 5665).

58. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 49, at 51, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.

at 5659, 5664.
59. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 48.
60. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)-(8) (1988).
61. Id. at § 101(3).
62. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 49; see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5659, 5667 ("The term 'literary
works' ... includes computer data bases, and computer programs to the extent
that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression for original
ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves.")
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works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical
symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects,
such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes,
disks, or cards, in which they are embodied." 63 The literal elements
of a computer program, the source and object codes, are works expressed in words or symbols and clearly fall within the category of
literary works. The Act's definition of a computer program does
not, however, cover the nonliteral elements of a program and courts
struggle to determine to what extent a computer program's copyright extends to those nonliteral elements.64
The leading case addressing the issue of copyright protection
for a work's nonliteral elements is Whelan, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory,Inc.6 5 The Whelan court fou d that the copyrights of
literary works can be infringed even when there is no substantial
similarity between the work's literal elements.6 6 The Whelan
ccurt cited Twentieth Century-FoxFilm Corp. v. MCA, Inc.,67 which
held that one can violate the copyright of a play or book by copying
its plot or plot devices, as well as other cases to support the idea thmt
copyright protection cannot be limited to the literal text of a
work. 68 The court then found by analogy that the copyrights of
computer programs can be infringed even absent copying of the literal elements of the program. 69 The court concluded that "copyright protection of computer programs may extend beyond the
70
programs' code to their structure, sequence, and organization."
Since the Whelan decision, nearly every court that has ruled on the
issue of the copyrightability of a program's sequence, structure, or
organization has followed Whelan. 71 The Whelan court did not
63. 17 U.S.C. § 101(3) (1988).

64. Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F.
Supp. 449, 454 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
65. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).

66. Id. at 1234.
67. 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1983).

68. Id.
69. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1234.
70. Id. at 1248.
71. See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173,
1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (nonliteral aspects such as "structure, sequence, and/or organization of the program" are copyrightable); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 830 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) ("copying of the

organization and structural details" can form bases for infringement);
Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1991, 1993
(N.D. Cal. 1989) (copyright applies to overall structure and organization of a
computer program); Pearl Syst., Inc. v. Competition Elec., Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1520, 1524 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("Copyright protection of computer software

is not limited to the text of the source or object code."); but see Plains Cotton
Cooperative Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (rejecting Whelan's protection for structure, sequence, and organization, court in-

stead held that sequence and organization, where dictated by market forces, is a
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however specifically extend a computer program's copyright protec72
tion to its screen displays.
To give protection to screen displays and other user-interface
elements, the courts generally use the "audiovisual works" category 73 of section 102(a).7 4 "Audiovisual works" are works that
"consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of... devices such as ... electronic
equipment... regardless of the nature of the material objects.., in
which the works are embodied."75 A court first employed audiovisual copyright protection for elements of a user-interface to protect
highly artistic computer-generated screens of video games. 76

To-

day, the "audiovisual works" category of section 102(a) is used to
protect user-interface of commercial software with little or no artistic originality.77 Audiovisual copyright protects "the appearances,
executable images, and input formats produced by the software on
the monitor screens and the sequence of keystrokes used to manipulate information or desired functions by the user."7 8
The "literary works" category79 of section 102 is also used to
provide protection for user-interface aspects of a computer program. The term "literary works".., includes.., compilations of
data. A compilation is a "work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work constitutes
an original work or authorship."8 0 After determining that a screen
display would need its own copyright, the court in Digital CommunicationAssociates, Inc. v. Softklone DistributingCorp. concluded
that the status screen of a computer program was copyrightable as a
compilation. 8 ' A "status screen" which is just one image displaying
a message, menu, or other information, would be a "literary
work"8 2 if written on a piece of paper as opposed to the computer
non-copyrightable idea rather than a copyrightable expression) reh'g denied,
813 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
72. Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F.
Supp. 449, 455 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
73. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (1988).
74. See Telemarketing Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA)
1991, 1995 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World Inc., 648
F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
76. Williams Elecs. v. Artic Int'l, 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Kramer Mfg.
Co., Inc. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986).
77. Brown, supra note 1, at 988.
78. Id.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1988).
80. Id. at § 101.
81. Digital, 659 F. Supp. at 462 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1988).
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screen. 3 The Digital court concluded that a status screen was a
"compilation" and within the scope of copyrightabiity as a section
84
102 "literary work."
Section 102(a)(5) grants copyright protection to "pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works."as The section 101 definition of a
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural work" states in pertinent part:
[Tihe design of a useful article ... shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can
be identified separately from, and are capable
of existing indepen86
dently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.
A "useful article" is an article "having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to
convey information."8 7 In the words of the court in Broderbund
Software Inc. v. Unison World, Inc.,8 8 "copyright protection extends only to the artistic aspects, and not the mechanical or utilitarian features of a protected work."8 9 The Broderbund court found
that the structure sequence and layout of the audiovisual displays in
question were dictated primarily by artistic and aesthetic considerations, and not by utilitarian or mechanical ones90 Thus, the court
found that the user-interface aspects of a computer program were
within the scope of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works," and,
therefore, within the scope of section 102(a). The court in Lotus
Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International91 also
found that audiovisual displays of a computer program were not
merely utilitarian in nature but had expressive elements that could
fall within the scope of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" as
well. "The point is that those elements of a useful article that can
exist independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article are potentially copyrightable because those elements are elements of expression that can be distinguished from the utilitarian functions of
the article." 92 The defendants in Lotus advanced a semantical argument stating that the screen displays were "articles," that they
were 'useful' and that useful articles were not protected by copyright law.93 The court found that the utilitarian aspects of "useful
83. Digital, 659 F. Supp. at 462.

84. Id. at 463.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1988).

86. Id. at § 101.
87. Id.
88. 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133 (N.D. Cal. 1986).

89. Id. at 1133.
90. Id.
91. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D.Mass.

1990).
92. Id. at 52.
93. Id. at 56-7.
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articles" were not copyrightable, however it also stated that "it is
not true ... that every aspect'94 of a user-interface that is 'useful' is
therefore not copyrightable.
Courts have found that the user-interface elements of computer software fall within the scope of section 102(a) as "audiovisual
works," as "compilations" that are "literary works," and as expressive aspects of "useful articles" that fall under the "pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works" category of section 102(a).
B.

The General Caveat of Section 102(b)

The judiciary has interpreted the specific language of Section
102(a), the subject matter of copyright protection, to include the
nonliteral structure, sequence, and organization of the program,
and the user-interface elements of the program. However, as the
court stated in Mastro Plastic Corp. v. NLRB,95 the judiciary must
"look to the provisions of the whole law" when interpreting statutory meaning.9 When interpreting copyrightability under section
102, the court must look at the specific language of 102(a) in light of
the general caveat of 102(b). Even if certain elements of computer
programs are considered "works of authorship" under section
102(a), they may not be "entitled to an unlimited scope of copyright
protection." 97 Section 102(b) states:
in no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.98
Computer programs are copyrightable only to the extent that they
incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of original
ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves.9 9 This distinction
is often referred to as the "idea/expression dichotomy."
1.

The idea/expressiondichotomy

The idea/expression dichotomy has its roots in the case of
Baker v. Selden.0° The Baker court held that the text of a book
describing a special method of double-entry on paper spreadsheets
(the T-accounts system) was copyrightable expression, but that the
94. Id. at 57.
95. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
96. Id. at 285 (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. 113, 122

(1850)).
97. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 49 (Mass.

1990).
98. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
99. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 49, at 54,57, reprintedin U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5667, 5670. See also, Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 53.
100. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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method itself, which embodied the idea of this particular kind of
double-entry bookkeeping, was not. The court concluded that
Baker did not infringe Selden's copyright when Baker wrote his
own treatise, in his own words, describing the special double-entry
method of bookkeeping.1 0 ' To encourage the flow of ideas, the judiciary protects the marketing of expression of a person's idea by enforcing a copyright on that expression. This provides a financial
incentive for people to share their ideas. The ideas themselves,
however, are unprotected. For example, two authors may have the
same idea of canoeing through the Columbia River Gorge and writing a book about their experience. Even though their books are
substantially similar, if one has not copied the expression of the
other, there is no infringement. The second author may even have
received the idea to write about canoeing through the Columbia
River Gorge by reading the first author's book, but if the second
author has not copied the first author's book, there is no copyright
infringement.
An exception to the idea/expression dichotomy is the doctrine
of merger. Some ideas can only be expressed in a limited number of
ways. When this occurs, the idea and the expression are said to
merge and the expression of the idea is not given copyright protection. 0 2 The leading case on the doctrine of merger is Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian.0 3 In Herbert, the issue was
whether or not the defendant infringed the plaintiffs copyright of a
jeweled bee pin.10 4 The court found that copyright protection was
limited to the expression of the idea and not the idea itself, and that
the plaintiff was free to take the idea of making jeweled pins in the
shape of a bee. The court, however, also found that there was only
one expression for the idea of a jeweled bee pin, namely, a jeweled
bee pin.1 05 The court noted that the idea and its expression appeared to be indistinguishable and ruled that the similarity between
the plaintiff's and defendant's pins was inevitable. 1 °6 The court ultimately held that where the idea and expression are inseparable,
07
copying the expression must be permitted.
The doctrine of merger applies not only when there is one ex101. Id.
102. See e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738,
742 (9th Cir. 1971); Johnson Control Sys., Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886
F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989); Digital Communications Assocs., Inc., v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 457-58 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Lotus Dev. Corp.
v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 59 (D. Mass. 1990); Telemarketing
Resources v. Symantec Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1991, 1993 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
103. 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971).
104. Id. at 739.
105. Id. at 742.
106. Id.
107. Rosenthal, 446 F.2d at 742.
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pression for an idea as in the Herbert case,1 08 but also when there
are a limited number of expressions for a given idea. If a particular
expression "is one of a quite limited number of the possible ways of
expressing the idea . . .the expression is not copyrightable."' 0 9
When the idea beyond the expression is such that it can be expressed in only a limited number of ways, then a party or number of
parties could copyright all the ways to express the idea and effectively deny any future use of the idea. 1 0 Affording copyright protection to expressions of ideas where there is one or a limited
number of expressions for the particular idea would grant a monopoly on the idea to the copyright owner.11 1
2.

The applicationof the idea/expressiondichotomy to the
nonliteralelements of a program

In 1986, the court in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory,Inc. 1 2 applied the idea/expression dichotomy to something other than a literal manifestation of a work for the first
time.1 13 The Whelen court drew the line between idea and expression at a place that provided copyright protection to the nonliteral
structure and sequence of a program. The Whelan court, expounding upon Baker v. Selden, found that one way to distinguish
idea from expression is to recognize that "the purpose or function of
a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything that is
not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the idea."1 14 In Bull HN Information Systems, Inc. v.
American Express Bank Ltd.,115 the court, adopting the Whelan
test, found that "to the extent structural similarities in a computer
proprogram are not necessary to the purpose or function of 1the
6
gram, they constitute a protectable expression of an idea. "
The court in Johnson Controls,Inc. v. Phoenix ControlSystems,
Inc., 1 7 used a different test to distinguish between idea and expres108. See also, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37,
59 (D. Mass. 1989); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1177, 1188
(N.D. Cal. 1989).
109. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 59; cf., Frybarger v. IBM Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 530
(9th Cir. 1987); NEC, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1188.
110. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 59.
111. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th

Cir. 1971).
112. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
113. See supra notes 62-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the application of § 102 to nonliteral elements of a program.

114. Whelan, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab. Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir.
1986).
115. No. 88 Civ. 2103 (SWK), 1990 WL 48098 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
116. Bull HN Infor. Sys., Inc. v. American Express Bank Ltd., No. 88 Civ.

2103 (SWK), 1990 WL 48098, at 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
117. 886 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1989).
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sion. The Johnson court found that if some discretion or opportunity for creativity existed in the creation of the programs structure,
the structure was copyrightable. 1 8
The functionality test of the Whelan court and the creativity
test of the Johnson court where combined by the court in Digital
Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing
9
Corporation"1
to distinguish copyrightable expression from
noncopyrightable idea in the area of user-interfaces. The Digital
court used the Whelan approach to find that "the use of a screen to
reflect the status of the program is an 'idea,' the use of a command
driven program is an 'idea,' and the typing of two symbols to activate a specific command is an 'idea,"' and hence not
copyrightable. 2 0
The legislative purpose of section 102(b) of the Copyright Act is
to restate and codify that the basic dichotomy between expression
and idea remains unchanged; expression is copyrightable, idea is
not. 2 1 The one major exception to this rule is- when a particular
idea has a limited number of expressions. To grant a copyright to
an expression under these circumstances would be to grant a copyright to the idea behind the expression.
Interpreting the language of section 102(a), the judiciary found
that certain nonliteral manifestations of computer software, including the user-interface, are original works of authorship fixed in tangible means of expression. They have also found that these same
nonliteral manifestations can be copyrightable expression, as opposed to noncopyrightable idea. Why is it then, that a debate exists
over how the user-interface should be protected? Why do some
courts hold that a program's copyright extends to protect the userinterface while others hold that the user-interface should have its
own copyright?2 2 This author believes that confusion exists because the judiciary has ignored the interdependent nature of computer software. The judiciary determined whether the structure of
a program or the user-interface of a program was copyrightable by
118. Johnson Control Sys., Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173,
1175 (9th Cir. 1989).
119. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
120. Digital, 659 F. Supp. at 459.
121. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 49, at 57, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5659, 5670.
122. Some courts suggest that the program's overall copyright should protect
the user-interface. See Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp.
1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986). Other courts suggest that the user-interface of a program
should have its own copyright. Digital Communications Assoc., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Ga. 1987). In fact the court in Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989)
created a legal fiction to suggest that there is a middle ground between these

two theories.
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looking only at those elements individually, and not by looking at
the program as a whole. Had the judiciary taken a step back and
recognized that computer programs are composite works with interdependent parts, their analysis would have been different.

III. THE INTERDEPENDENT NATURE OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS
AND THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF USER-INTERFACES

The judiciary has questionably interpreted the language of section 102 to provide copyright protection to the nonliteral user-interface of computer software. Section 102 was not drafted with
nonliteral expression in mind. Even the statutory definition of a
computer program, by only referencing "statements and instructions," 123 suggests that the statute recognizes that a program is
made up of only literal manifestations. Nonetheless, the Whelan
court extended copyright protection past the literal manifestation
of a work and granted copyright protection to a nonliteral manifestation of a computer program for the first time. The Whelan court
did not, however, address how or whether copyright protection
should extend to the user-interface of a program. 2 4 Consequently,
several theories emerged on how this nonliteral manifestation
should be protected. Most of the theories are a combination of two
main theories.- 25 The first theory, called the extension theory, espouses the notion that the program's copyright, or the copyright of
the literal manifestation of the program, should cover the nonliteral manifestations as well. The second theory referred to as the
separate copyright theory, concludes that the user-interface of a
program should have its own copyright. Under both the extension
theory and the separate copyright theory, the interdependent nature of computer software prohibits the judiciary from finding the
user-interface to be copyrightable under section 102.
A.

The InterdependentNature of Computer Software Prevents
the JudiciaryFrom Finding That the Copyright of the
Underlying ProgramExtends to Protect the
Program's User-Interface

The extension theory was applied in the case of Broderbund
Software, Inc. v. Unison World Inc.126 In Broderbund,Broderbund
Software Inc. developed and copyrighted a program called Print
1 27
Shop that created greeting cards, signs, posters, and banners.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
124. Digital Communications Assoc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp.

449, 455 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
125. See, e.g., Dorny & Friedland, supra note 5.

126. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
127. Id. at 1130.
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The Broderbund software was developed for use on Apple computers. 2 8 The defendant, seeing a market for a similar program
for IBM compatible machines, developed a program called
Printmaster. 129 The defendant's program had similar screen displays which led Broderbund to file for copyright infringement. 30
Because the court in Broderbund "discussed the screens and the underlying program as a unit, the court's opinion has generally been
construed as holding that a copyright of a program also protects the
screen displays generated by it."''1 The Broderbund court based its
holding on the Whelan decision. The Broderbundcourt applied the
reasoning of Whelan, which found that a program's structure was
copyrightable, to find that the arrangement of screens was copyrightable also. 13 2
1.

Whelan revisited

The Whelan court dealt with an alleged infringement of the
nonliteral structure sequence and organization of a computer program, but its holding is employed to find user-interfaces to be copyrightable expression. The Whelan court found that the "purpose or
function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part
of the expression of the idea."' 133 The Whelan court's finding was
based on its reading of Baker v. Selden.'34 The Whelan court stated
that "as Baker v. Selden 13 5 focused on the end sought to be achieved
by Selden's book, the line between idea and expression may be
drawn with reference to the end sought to be achieved by the work
in question."'1 6 Determining the desired end or purpose of a
wholly literal work like that in Baker v. Selden, however, is very
different from determining the purpose of a work with nonliteral
elements.
In Baker v. Selden, Selden obtained a copyright on his book
which described a new simplified system of accounting. 137 The
book included blank forms for use in Selden's accounting system. 138
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1130-31.
130. Broderbund, 659 F. Supp. at 1131.
131. Jeffrey R. Benson, Note, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Screen
Displays, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1123, 1128 (1988).
132. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133
(N.D. Cal. 1986).
133. Whelan, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir.
1986).
134. 101 U.S. 99 (1880)
135. Id.
136. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1236.
137. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880).
138. Id.
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Baker was charged with infringing Selden's copyright by making
and selling accounting books that used substantially the same system of accounting and a reproduction of the blank forms that Selden had included in the back of his book.139 Both parties agreed
that Selden's new method of accounting was uncopyrightable as a
method or idea. 140 Both parties also agreed that the text portion of
Baker's book did not infringe on Selden's copyright.' 4 1 The issue
was whether the blank forms that Baker reproduced and included
in his book were "necessary incidents" to the method of accounting,
or simply part of the text of the book.' 42 If the method of accounting could not be used without the use of the blank forms, then the
forms were "necessary incidents" and were not copyrightable. If
they were considered part of the text, then they were expression,
and the forms would be protected by the book's copyright. 4 3 The
Baker court found that the forms were indeed "necessary incidents"
and hence were part of the idea behind the method of accounting
1
and not protected by the book's copyright. '
In Whelan, the Jaslow Dental lab felt that "the business operations of Jaslow Lab could be made more efficient if they were computerized."'145 Jaslow Lab hired Whelan to write a program to meet
the needs of Jaslow Lab. 146 Whelan wrote a program for use on a
certain IBM machine.147 Jaslow Lab realized that there was a market for the program in offices with smaller computers and wrote
another program for use on a variety of smaller computers. 148 The
court found that Jaslow Lab's program "although written in a different computer language from [Whelan's program] and although
not a direct transliteration of [Whelan's program], was substantially
similar to [Whelan's program] because its structure and overall organization were substantially similar."'149 The Whelan court
reached its decision by analogizing Ms. Whelan's program for the
efficient management of a dental lab's finances, to Selden's method
of accounting.'-" By finding that the purpose or desired end of the
Whelan program was simply the management of a dental lab's finances, the Whelan court easily found that the structure and organ139. Id.
140. Id.

141. Baker, 101 U.S. at 102.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 103.

144. Id. at 104.
145. Whelan, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1225 (3d Cir.

1986).

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1226.
Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1228-29.
Id. at 1238.
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ization of the program was not a "necessary incident" 151 and
therefore copyrightable expression. L5 2 The purpose of Whelan's
program, however, was not simply the management of a dental lab's
finances. The Whelan court failed to consider the interdependent
nature of computer programs and in failing to do so, drew an improper analogy.
2.

The purpose of a program

The purpose of most commercial computer programs is comprised'of three interdependent purposes corresponding to the three
different parts of commercial software; the basic form, the structure and organization, and the user-interface. 15 3 The purpose of the
"basic form" of a program is simply to be able to instruct the computer to perform tasks outlined in the flowchart. The purpose of
the structure and organization of the program is different from, but
dependent upon, the purpose of the "basic form" of the program.
The purpose of the structure and organization of a program is efficiency. Efficiency is vital if the software is to be commercially successful. The purpose of the user-interface is different from both the
purpose of the "basic form" of the program and the structure and
organization of the program, but likewise, dependent on both of
them. The purpose of a program's user-interface is to make the efficient "basic form" of the program easy for the average user to run.
This usually entails writing additional code, often in a completely
14
different programming languageM
than the "basic form" of the
program.
The purpose or desired end of the Whelan program was not
simply the management of a dental lab's finances, but rather an efficiently fast, easy to use program to manage a dental lab's finances.
The Whelan court analogized the desired end or purpose of Selden's book to only part of the desired end or purpose of Whelan's
program. A proper analogy to the desired end of the whole program reveals that the structure and organization and the user-interface are "necessary incidents" to the purpose of the program, and
are therefore part of the idea of the program which is not
copyrightable.
The Broderbund court held that the user-interface of a program was not necessary to the function of the program because the
court found that another program had the same idea as
151. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880).
152. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238.
153. See supra pp. 745-48 for a discussion of software's three interdependent
parts.

154. User-interfaces are usually written in a "shell language" like "C-shell"
which was designed specifically for the purpose of programming user interfaces.
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Printmaster, but the other program had a different user-interface.
The court concluded that this meant the particular user-interface of
Printmaster was not inseparable from the program's idea, and was
therefore, copyrightable. The court, however, made the same mistake that the Whelan court made. The court mistook the function
of the overall program for the function of the "basic form" of the
program. The court in essence found that the user-interface expression was separate from the idea behind the "basic form" of the
program, and therefore, copyrightable. The court did not take into
account the fact that the idea behind the overall program was a
combination of the separate ideas behind the "basic form" of the
program, the structure and organization of the program, and the
user-interface of the program. The extension theory is applied by
looking at the function or purpose of the "basic form" of the program to define what constitutes idea in the screens. 155 Because the
idea behind the nonliteral user-interface is different from the idea
behind the literal code of the "basic form" of the program, the
screen displays will always be found to be separate from the idea
behind the "basic form" and therefore always be found to be copyrightable. If a programmer writes a program that has a similar
user-interface to another program, but which is generated by a different code in a different language, infringement may be found
although none exists. The extension theory of protecting user-interfaces offers few guidelines to future programmers who must continue to be wary of infringing another's copyright even though they
have written completely different code. Infringement will always
be based on circumstantial evidence and such an application of Section 102 can only lead to endless litigation.'1
B.

The InterdependentNature of Computer Software Prohibits
the JudiciaryFrom Finding the User-Interface
Copyrightable Under the Separate Copyright
Theory

A logical alternative to the extension theory is the separate
copyright theory. If protecting user-interfaces with the copyright of
the underlying program is troublesome, why not give the user-interface its own copyright? The Digital court used the separate
copyright theory to provide copyright protection for user-interfaces.
The court determined that computer screens should have their own
copyrights after the manner of video games whose screens are sepa155. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1133
(N.D. Cal. 1986).
156. Peter G. Spivack, Does Form Follow Functions? The Idea/Expression
Dichotomy in Copyright Protectionof Computer Software, 35 UCLA L. REV.
723, 735 (1988).
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rately copyrighted. The Digital court reasoned that a computer
screen can be copied by a program that in no way copied the underlying program that generated the copied screen display.157 Since
the screen display was not a "direct copy" of the literary or substantive content of the computer program, the Digital court concluded
that "a computer program's copyright protection does not extend to
the program's screen displays and that copying of a program's
screen displays, without evidence of copying of the program's
source code, object code, sequence, organization or structure, does
158
not state a claim of infringement."
To determine whether user-interfaces are copyrightable under
the separate copyright theory, courts generally apply the creativity
test. The court in Johnson Control Systems, Inc. v. Phoenix Control
Systems, Inc.'5 9 was one of the first courts to use the "creativity
test" to find that a nonliteral part of a computer program was copyrightable expression. The Johnson court found that where some
discretion or opportunity for creativity existed in the creation of the
program's structure, the structure was copyrightable. 16° Applying
the creativity test to user-interfaces, the court in Lotus v. Development Corp. v. PaperbackSoftware Internationaland Stephenson
Software, Ltd.16 1 found that because certain aspects of its user-interface were not used in every spreadsheet program, those aspects
162
were the product of creativity and therefore copyrightable.
When determining whether the user-interface of a program is copyrightable expression, however, the courts must keep in mind the
interdependent nature of a computer program.
The purpose or function of the user-interface is to make the
basic form of the program easy to use. It is a "necessary incident"' 6 3 to the overall program. The user-interface involves some
creativity, but it is first and foremost functional in nature. The
functional nature of the user-interface limits the creativity of the
user-interface. To use an oft cited analogy, the user-interface is
much like the "figure-H" pattern of a stickshift. 164 The pattern's
sole purpose is to make the operation of shifting gears convenient
or easy. The pattern is chosen with the fact that the car needs four
157. Digital Communications Assoc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp.
449, 455 (N.D. Ga. 1987).

158. Id. at 456.
159. 886 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1989).
160. Id. at 1176.
161. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).

162. Id. at 68.
163. See supra notes 142-152 and accompanying text for a discussion of "necessary incident."
164. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp.
1003, 1013 (N.D. Tex. 1978); cf. Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Com-

puter Serv., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987).
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gear positions and a neutral position in mind. The pattern has an
element of creativity in that the manufacture could have chosen a
different figure that would have worked equally well. The "figureK" pattern, for example, has positions that could correspond to the
four gear positions and the neutral position. Other patterns such as
the "+ symbol, or the "figure-x", or the "figure-I" could have
worked as well. A pattern without five distinctive positions could
also have worked, but would not have been as convenient, and the
purpose for creating the gear shift pattern would have been foiled.
It is clear that although the pattern selection involves some creativity, that creativity is limited by the functionality of the pattern.
The H-pattern is necessary to the overall purpose of the gearshift
assembly. Likewise, the user-interface is necessary to the overall
purpose of the program. In Baker v. Selden, 65 the court found that
the blank forms contained in the back of Selden's book were necessary incidents to Selden's specific method of accounting. As such,
they were considered part of the method itself or the idea behind
the method, and not part of the copyrightable expression contained
in the book.' 6 6 If the court had solely based its decision on whether
there was the opportunity for discretion or creativity in designing
the forms, they would have reached the wrong conclusion, because
creating the forms involved a measure of creativity. The judiciary
ignores the interdependent nature of the software and looks only at
the creativity of the user-interface to incorrectly find that it is copyrightable expression.
The interdependent nature of computer software also inhibits
the copyrightability of the user-interface under the separate copyright theory because of the doctrine of merger. 16 7 User-interfaces
are different from literal forms of expression. The computer screen
is limited in size, restricting the expression of ideas that appear on
the screen. As a result, "there are only three basic types of interface styles: menus, command languages, and interactive design.' 168
User-interfaces can also be limited by market factors. Computer
16 9
screens often emulate standard forms in a particular industry.
Additionally, "considerations of efficiency, ease of use, and skills of
165. 101 U.S. 99 (1880).

166. Whelan, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir.
1986).
167. See supra notes 101-111 and accompanying text for discussion of the doctrine of merger.
168. Dorny & Friedland, supra note 5, at 205. "A 'Menu' is a list of items on
the screen from which the user may choose one. 'Command languages' accept
input from the user in a specific format which the user must know. 'Interactive
Design' prompts the user for the necessary information based on prior entries.
Many programs use some combination of styles." Id. at 205, n. 69.
169. See Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d
1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987).
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the intended audience can greatly restrict the viable interface
choices."' 70 Finally, the underlying program always limits the userinterface. The features of the underlying basic form of the program
determine how that program is to be packaged by the user-interface. The user-interface is a means to an end. The end is userfriendliness for the underlying program. The end always dictates
the means used to achieve that end. These limiting factors will
cause the idea behind the user-interface of a program and the expression of the program to merge.
Protecting the user-interface in these instances denies the use
of the underlying idea. This is not the purpose of copyright protection, and so when an idea and its expression merge, the expression
is not granted copyright protection.17 1 More likely, however, these
limiting factors will lead courts to find infringement where none
exists.
Adding to the already confused climate surrounding user-interfaces, the copyright office decided, after the Digital decision, to enforce its long-standing policy not to register separate copyrights for
screen displays.' 7 2 The copyright office permits a single registration of a computer program to extend copyright protection to the
screen displays so long as they contain original creative authorship. 173 The interdependent nature of the software prohibits copyright protection for the user-interface under section 102 of the
Copyright Act. It prohibits protection under the extension theory
because the user-interface is a necessary incident to the idea of the
overall program. Thus, the user-interface is inseparable from the
idea and cannot be protected under section 102(b). The interdependent nature of software also prohibits protection under the separate
copyright theory even if the copyright office were to allow separate
registration, because the creativity or discretion involved in the
user-interface is inherently limited. This leads to a merger of the
idea behind the user-interface and its expression, making it unprotectable under section 102(b).
The scope of copyrightability under section 102 was drafted
with literal manifestations in mind. Composite works like software, that have both literal and nonliteral manifestations that are
dependent on each other, have given the judiciary trouble when the
judiciary tries to apply copyright law to them. Decisions in this area
170. Dorny & Fr 2land, supra note 5, at 205.
171. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th
Cir. 1971).
172. The Digital decision came down at a time when the copyright office was
granting separate copyright registrations to screen displays despite its own
policy.
173. See generally, Ralph Oman, 36 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) 155 (1988).
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have become "increasingly contorted as they attempt to manipulate
an existing statutory framework that is unsuited to the field.... At
some point... it will be impossible to bend the existing legal framework any further."'174 The interdependent nature of software
makes user-interfaces uncopyrightable under the language of section 102. In addition, due to the interdependent nature of user-interfaces, protecting them conflicts with the constitutional purpose
of promoting the progress of science.
IV.

THE INTERDEPENDENT NATURE OF SOFTWARE iAKES THE

PRESENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 102 AT
ODDS WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSE
OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT
When expounding statutory mandates, the judiciary must not
limit its examination to the specific language of a provision or to the
provisions of a statute as a whole, but must also look to the object
and policy behind the statutory provisions. 175 The judiciary must
determine whether the interpretation they have given a particular
provision is consistent with the provision's intended purpose.
The purpose of granting copyright protection to works of authorship is not to reward the author, but "to serve the public welfare by encouraging authors.., to generate new ideas and disclose
them to the public."'1 76 Rewarding the author with personal gain is
merely the best way courts advance public welfare. 177 When construing section 102 of the Copyright Act, the judiciary "must be
faithful to the statutory language and mindful of both the ultimate
goal of copyright law-the advancement of public welfare-and
Congress' chosen method of achieving this goal-private reward to
the individual author."'378 Courts must not draw the line between
the copyrightable and the uncopyrightable elements of a computer
program, or in other words, the line between a program's idea and
its expression, in a way that discourages authors or programmers
from generating new ideas and disclosing them to the public. Simply stated, "[a] copyright should not grant anyone more economic
power than is necessary to achieve the incentive to create." 179
Protecting the user-interface of a program does not provide the
incentive to create. It discourages rather than promotes the
174.
175.
States
176.

Dorny & Friedland, supra note 5, at 208.
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956) (quoting United
v. Heirs of Boisdore, 49 U.S. 118, 122 (1850)).
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l. 740 F. Supp. 37, 52 (D.

Mass. 1990).
177. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
178. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 53.
179. NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
WORKS 12 (1978).
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"[p]rogress of Science and useful arts"' 80 in the area of computer
software by prohibiting innovators from improving or building
upon the work of their predecessors. This may stifle innovation in
the user-interface, and in the basic form of the program that generates the user-interf& -e.
The fact that the "progress of science" benefits from allowing
scientists and inventors to build on the work of their predecessors
was recognized long ago. L8 ' Sir Isaac Newton declared, "If I have
seen further it is by standing on [the] shoulders of Giants."1 8 2 The
court in Lotus Development Corp. v. PaperbackSoftware International and Stephenson Software, Ltd,18 3 referring to Sir Isaac
Newton's declaration, stated that "the legally relevant shoulders of
programming giants are their ideas-and do not extend to all of
their expressions."'14
In the case of composite works such as software, where the
user-interface is necessary to accomplish the desired task of the
overall program, copyrighting the user-interface denies successors
access to both the ideas and the expressions of the underlying program. Because programs are interdependent in nature, protecting
one part of a program affects the other parts. If the effect of trying
to protect one part of the program results in stifling innovation in
another, the judiciary should think twice before granting copyright
protection to the first part. The user-interfaces of one program may
become an industry standard, thus, they can be used as shields
against competitive programs. This prevents the ideas for those
programs from being shared with the public. This clearly inhibits
progress of science which is the constitutional purpose of the Copyright Act. The judiciary should not try to protect part of the program at the expense of another, especially if the part they are
trying to protect exists only to serve a more important part.
User-interfaces make software easy for the lay person, or one
who has no idea as to how or what the software is actually doing.
The general user does not care how or what the software does. The
general user merely wants to feel certain that if they push a certain
key, they will get a certain result. The easier it is to get the result
the better. Users will gravitate to the software that has the most
user-friendly interfaces. Once a user-interface in a particular type
of software is established as the most user-friendly, a "de facto industry standard" is created and programmers try to emulate that
180. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8,

cl. 8.

181. Id.
182.

ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POST-

SCRIPT 31 (1965) (quoting a letter from Sir Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke on
February 5, 1675).
183. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
184. Id. at 78.
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standard. 8 5 This in turn reinforces the particular user-interface as
the industry standard. New programs will not be successful if their
user-interfaces are below the accepted standard. 8 6 Once enough
users have become accustomed to a certain user-interface when
working with a particular type of software, they become reluctant
to use even a better type of the same software if it means learning
how it works. There is also a tremendous cost involved in retraining users. Additionally, "the first developer of successful software
who is able to set an industry standard may now use the copyright
law as a shield against competitive market forces."'18 7
User-interfaces have a certain amount of creativity, but their
primary purpose in the context of the overall program is functional.
User-interfaces exist only to make the "basic form" of the program
easy to use. Without the "basic form" of the program, there is no
need for the user-interface. If this functional aspect becomes standardized and is allowed to be copyrighted, programers will have to
write completely different user-interfaces which users will not use.
The innovative and creative ideas of those other programs will be
lost. In this regard, computer programs are much like presents.
The gift is packaged in wrapping paper that makes it more presentable to the receiver. If a certain kind of wrapping paper becomes
the standard, and is the only kind of wrapping paper that the receiver will open, gifts in other wrapping paper will never be opened
and the gifts will be lost. Programs, like presents are interdependent in nature. Programs consist of an underlying efficient "basic
form" analogous to the gift, and packaged in a user-interface, analogous to the wrapping paper. Gifts are wrapped in a variety of ways,
but the wrapping is limited by the size and shape and general features of the gift. Likewise, the user-interface is limited by the features of the program. Standardized user-interfaces, if copyright
protected, deny programmers the opportunity to share innovative
programming ideas with society. The question is whether we want
innovation in wrapping paper, or innovation in the underlying gifts.
When interpreting a statutory provision, the judiciary should
not lose sight of the purpose of the provision. The purpose of the
Copyright Law is to encourage innovation. Computer software is a
composite work, thus protecting the user-interface affects the rest
of the software. One effect is that successors will be unable to improve the work of their predecessors without prohibitive costs. If
the user-interface has become a de facto industry standard, then
protecting the user-interfaces will be at the expense of the underly185. Anthony R. Barkume, ProprietaryProtectionof Computer User Interfaces, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 559, 578 (1990).
186. Id.
187. Brown, supra note 1, at 977.
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ing program which generates the user-interface. Both of these results are against the constitutional purpose of the Copyright Act.
VI. CONCLUSION

The user-interface of computer software is a very important
part of an overall computer program. It is the link between the
user and the internal workings of the program. It allows the ordinary computer user to access an intricate program and have that
program instruct the computer to perform various tasks. It is important to the marketing of the overall program because users often
judge a program by how easy the program is to use, not by the innovative way a program operates.
The user-interface elements of computer software fall within
the scope of section 102(a).ls When interpreting copyrightability
under Section 102, the court must look at the specific language of
102(a) in light of the general caveat of 102(b). Section 102(b) states:
"In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work."18 9 Computer programs are copyrightable only to the extent
that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of
original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves. 19°
Generally courts use two methods to distinguish idea from expression in the user-interface of a program. First, courts call the
purpose or function of a program the program's idea. Everything
that is not necessary to the purpose or function of the program is
the program's expression. Second courts determine whether there
is any discretion or creativity in choosing the user-interface. If
there is, the user-interface is separate from the program's idea and
thus, is copyrightable.
An exception to the idea/expression dichotomy is the doctrine
of merger. Some ideas can only be expressed in a limited number of
ways. When this occurs, the idea and the expression are said to
merge and the expression of the idea is not given copyright
19 1
protection.
188. See sup-ra notes 48-94 and accompanying text for discussion of section

102(a).
189. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
190. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 49, at 54, 57 reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5667, 5670. See also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l,

740 F. Supp. 37, 53 (D. Mass. 1990).

191. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th

Cir. 1971); Johnson Control Sys., Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d
1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989); Digital Communications Assoc. v. Softklone Distrib.
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There are generally two schools of thought as to how a userinterface should be protected. The first is that the user-interface
should be protected by the copyright of the overall program. The
second is that the user-interface should have its own copyright.
Had the judiciary acknowledged the interdependent nature of computer software, the judiciary would have found that neither school
of thought could be applied to protect user-interfaces. Under the
first theory, the user-interface is a necessary incident to the purpose
of the overall program and under Baker v. Selden,192 therefore, it is
part of the program's idea. Idea's cannot be copyrighted under Section 102(b). Under the second theory, the user-interface's functionality limits its creativity so that the idea and expression merge.
Under the merger doctrine, limited expressions are not granted
copyright protection. Thus, neither school of thought justifies copyrighting user-interfaces.
The interdependent nature of computer software also makes
protecting the user-interface at odds with the constitutional purpose of the Copyright Act. The purpose of copyright law is to promote innovation and progress. Interpreting Section 102 of the
Copyright Act to protect the user-interfaces of computer programs
denies innovators the opportunity to improve or build on the work
of their predecessors. Thus, the resulting industry standards stifle
productive competition.
Copyright protection "was not originally intended to prevent
competitors from offering similar products."' 93 Copyrightable expression should encourage innovation, not discourage it. User-interface designers themselves oppose copyright protection for userinterfaces because they believe such protection would be harmful,
rather than helpful, to the industry.1 94 Interpreting section 102 as
providing copyright protection for user-interfaces denies programmers access to the work of their predecessors and limits progress in
the area of this "useful science." Thus, copyrights should not protect user-interfaces.

mantec Corp. 1989 WL 200350 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback
Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 59 (D. Mass. 1990).

192. 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880).
193. Brown, supra note 1, at 987.
194. Pamela Samuelson & Robert J. Glushko, Comparingthe Views of Lawyers and User Interface Designers,30 JURIMETRICS 137 (1990). When Lotus Development Corporation, the developer of the software whose screens set the
standard for spreadsheet software user-interfaces, brought a "look and feel"
suit against a competitor, many programmers picketed Lotus' headquarters.
The programmers feared that protection of the "look and feel" would make it
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